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Abstract. Although the concept of public service marketing was initially criticized in the 
marketing literature as confusing, it eventually became widely embraced by marketing 
scholars. Marketing scholars agreed that by the end of the 1970s there was no longer any 
serious controversy among marketing scholars about public service marketing concept. 
However, despite this apparent agreement among marketing academics, public 
administrators and academics in public administration areas have not unanimously 
embraced the utility of the concept of public services marketing. Two objectives formed the 
framework for this study: What are the assumptions, conceptualizations and disciplinary 
perspectives underlying the public services marketing concept? Can a superior 
conceptualization(s) be developed which is likely to be acceptable to a larger proportion of 
public services providers? Paper suggests three alternative conceptualizations of public 
services marketing.  
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1. Introduction 
hapiro (1973) and Kotler & Levy (1969a) introduced nonprofit marketing in 
the business literature. Kotler & Murray (1975) introduced marketing as a 
concept into public administration literature in theleading North American 
public administration journal. Since that time the word public services 
marketinghas become an established term in the public manager's lexicon. 
Although the concept of public service marketing was initially criticized in the 
marketing literature as confusing (Luck, 1969; 1974), it eventually became widely 
embraced by marketing scholars (Nickels, 1974). Lovelock & Weinberg (1978) 
noted that by the end of the 1970s there was no longer any serious controversy 
among marketing scholars about public service marketing. However, despite this 
apparent agreement among marketing academics, public administrators and 
academics in public administration areas have not unanimously embraced the 
utility of the concept of public services marketing. Leading philosopher of 
marketing Hunt (1976) observed the reluctance of some more than four decades 
ago: 
Until administrators of nonprofit organizations perceive that they have 
marketing problems, their marketing decision making will inevitably suffer. 
Thus, the major substantive problem concerning broadening the concept of 
marketing lies in the area of marketing to nonmarketers. (italics original) 
(pp.24-25). 
During the subsequent decades, the ‚marketing to nonmarketers‛ problem in the 
context of the public services marketing, has split public services providers into 
two camps comprised of its eloquent supporters and rigid opponents. Roberto 
(1991, p.81) was first who clearly stated that ‚marketing to nonmarketers‛ problem 
has received ‚a bipolar love-hate evaluation."  
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Those public service providers, who are critical of marketing, do partially 
recognize the need of public administrators to adopt new management techniques 
to deal with the prevailing environment of less-government-more-user-fees. 
However, they refer to the application of marketing principles within the nonprofit 
and public administration fields as ‚confusion compounded‛, ‚an inappropriate 
model‛, ‚intellectualization‛, ‚absurd‛, ‚the megalomaniac marketing supremacy 
syndrome‛, and ‚a dramatic imitation‛ of social relationships (Arndt, 1978; Capon 
& Mauser, 1982; Luck, 1974; Loveday, 1991; Monieson, 1988; VandenHeede & 
Pelican, 1995). The opponents’ position was perhaps best articulated by Walsh 
(1994, p.68) who suggested the need to redefine public services marketing ‚…if it 
is to be specifically public service marketing rather a pale imitation of a private 
sector approach within the public sector.‛  
In contrast to the position of marketing opponents, supportive commentators 
refer to its use as ‚a comprehensive strategy for effecting social change‛ with 
‚unique concepts and techniques‛ which are ‚coming of age‛ and are merely 
‚misunderstood‛ (Leathar & Hastings, 1987; Lovelock & Weinberg, 1978; 
Hastings & Haywood, 1991; Roberto, 1991). Ironically, the ultimate goal of 
marketing proponents was essentially the same as that of its opponents--to increase 
the effectiveness and responsiveness of public organizations in a changed financial 
environment. The essence of the difference in opinions appears to relate to the 
means by which this commonly recognized goal should be achieved.  
The midterm status of the public services marketing was perhaps best 
summarized by Kerin (1996, p.6). In his comprehensive review of outstanding 
contributions published during the last 60 yearsin the Journal of Marketing, Kerin 
characterized the works of Kotler, Levy, and associates (Kotler, 1972; Kotler & 
Levy, 1969a; 1969b; Kotler & Zaltman, 1971) as ‚controversial.‛ 
The overall status of the public services marketing was perhaps best 
summarized byauthors themselves. Three decades later, after introducing the 
broadening idea, authors of the broadeningmarketing proposition confessed: 
The broadening idea created a stir. It was criticized by some people as 
obvious, wrongheaded, and even as evil. One piece (Laczniak & Michie, 
1979) in the Journal ofthe Academy of Marketing Science accused us of 
creating social disorder by distorting thedefinition of marketing. (Levy, 2003, 
p.5). 
The following objectives formed the framework for this study: What are the 
assumptions, conceptualizations and disciplinary perspectives underlying the 
public services marketing concept? Can a superior conceptualization(s) be 
developed which is likely to be acceptable to a larger proportion of public services 
providers? 
 
2. Method 
The method of investigative research was undertaken because the concept of 
public services marketing is accepted by a majority of marketing scholars but, at 
the same time, rejected by many public service providers. The notions of 
investigative research (Douglas, 1976) and an underlying adversary research 
paradigm (Levine, 1974), emerged in response to limitations identified in the 
statistical analysis and cooperative research paradigm. Levine (1974, p.669) noted: 
By an adversary model, I mean that we are dealing with a situation in which 
there are claims and counterclaims, and arguments and counterarguments, 
each side advanced by an advocate who attempts to make the best possible 
case for his position. The scientific community, in the form of an editor, a 
referee, or a program committee, acts as a judge does in a preliminary 
hearing, deciding whether there is a sufficient case made in the particular 
study to take it to trial before the scientific community. 
Douglas (1976, p.57) maintains that the work of researchers who use the 
adversary model is similar to the work of detectives, investigative journalists, 
judges, and prosecutors. All of them are confronted with the same type of 
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problems: misinformation, evasions, lies, fronts, taken-for-granted meanings, 
problematic meanings, and self-deceptions.  
The rationale for choosing investigative research included a need to test the 
extent to which the current concept of public services marketing is objective and 
values free. Morrow & Brown (1994) contend that circumstances of theory 
production (e. g., contract research) or characteristics of the theory producer (e. g., 
political party associations, sexual orientation) may affect the conclusive 
arguments of research. Similarly, Harvey (1990) argues that researchers may 
experience "pressures" from such sources as research funders, academic 
administrators, and the business or political establishments during the research 
process.  
Because several opponents of public sector marketing have persistently 
identified additional conceptual data that has been ignored in discussion of the 
public services marketing concept, the negative case analysis was chosen. Kidder 
(1981, p.244) compares procedures of negative case analysis with statistical tests of 
significance. A goal of both methods is ‚to handle error variance." During negative 
case analysis, all existing propositions, null hypotheses, or assumptions underlying 
theories or concepts, are tested and refined against alternative explanations until no 
or a minimum possible number of alternative explanations are left. Kidder (1981, 
p.241) notes: "negative case analysis requires that the researcher look for 
disconfirming data in both past and future observations. A single negative case is 
enough to require the investigator to revise a hypothesis."  This method is 
consistent with the Hegelian method of dialectic, which suggests that any proposed 
thesis should be countered by an antithetical proposition in order to achieve 
synthesis. 
Application of negative case analysis in this study included two major elements. 
The first element dealt with results of the investigative research and included a 
search for alternative concepts or disconfirming data. For example, if investigative 
research found that some concepts from the social science disciplines were 
borrowed to develop the public sector marketing concept (e. g. the concept of 
formal organizations from organizational theory, or the concept of social exchange 
from sociology), then these concepts (the concepts of formal organization and 
social exchange in our example) were analyzed and the existence of alternative 
conceptualizations was investigated in the organizational theory or sociological 
literatures. If alternative conceptualizations were found, then they were studied and 
analyzed in the context of their usefulness for the public services marketing 
discussion.  
The second step in negative case analyses was to investigate the potential for 
conceptual consistency among and between the existing and the revealed 
alternative concepts. For example, if alternative conceptualizations of both social 
exchange theory and formal organizations were found, they could be compared 
with each other looking for possible consistency, connections, or links among 
them. For instance, were they developed by the same authors, in the same 
university, at the same period of time? Do they share something in common, for 
example, the same fundamental premises? If links were found, they could be 
recorded and analyzed. In summary, the investigative research procedures were 
focused on "vertical" search and identification of disciplinary and conceptual 
sources, and the negative case analysis supplemented this analysis by investigating 
a "horizontal" search of alternative conceptualizations within a particular social 
science discipline.  
Supplemented by investigative research, the negative case analysis attempts to 
find out if researchers who developed the concept of public sector marketing 
suppressed evidence. Kahane (1973, p.233) contends that such actions can occur 
when a researcher "conceals evidence unfavorable to his own position."  It does not 
necessarily mean that a researcher on purpose hid or omitted evidence or 
alternative concepts. As suggested by Douglas (1976) a researcher may have a 
diversity of reasons for suppressing evidence. Negative case analysis assists in 
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avoiding the suppression of evidence by checking if alternative conceptualizations 
were considered and consequentially incorporated.  
Maxwell (1996, p.90) noted that: ‚the most serious threat to the theoretical 
validity of an account is not collecting or paying attention to discrepant data, or not 
considering alternative explanations or understandings of the phenomena you are 
studying.‛ The conceptualization of public sector marketing cannot be generic and 
universal if its originators purposefully or mistakenly ignored alternative 
explanations. The issue is analogous to public hearings and legal proceedings, 
where both offensive and defensive parties are given the right to be heard. In order 
to be fair, the negative case analysis focused on the evidence available and reported 
prior to, and not after, development of the concept of public sector marketing. 
Because some researchers have challenged the appropriateness of the marketing 
concept based on the voluntary exchange paradigm in the public services context, 
the method of theoretical triangulation was adopted. Triangulation involves 
validating conclusions by using multiple observers, theories, methods and data 
sources in order to overcome biases associated with a single method, observer, 
theory, or data source (Patton, 1990). Triangulation is closely associated with the 
modus operandi of detectives, and it partly overlaps investigative research and 
negative case analysis procedures (Scriven, 1974). Implementation of this method 
is, in the words of Miles & Huberman (1996, p.267), mere "analytic induction"--
seeing or hearing multiple instances from different sources and reconciling the 
findings of the different approaches.  
Levine (1974, p.669) suggested that theoretical triangulation could be compared 
with a cross-examination test: 
… the particular position asserted in a paper is subject to cross-examination 
or further probing. Attempts by others at replication, new experiments, and 
inclusive logical critiques of experiments, or of an area of study, may all be 
viewed as attacks on a particular position by advocates of another position. In 
legal proceedings, the cross-examination is considered the essential safeguard 
to the accuracy and completeness of testimony. The cross-examination tests 
the credibility of the direct testimony, or it brings out additional related facts 
that may modify the inference one draws from some bit of testimony. 
In this study, theoretical triangulation was undertaken in the form of cross-
examination of findings identified by investigative research and negative case 
analysis. One of the goals of theory triangulation, according to Patton (1990), is to 
understand how different assumptions and fundamental premises held by various 
stakeholders affect conclusions. Therefore, implementation of theoretical 
triangulation in this study included not only reconciling, cross-examination, and 
evaluation of existing null assumptions of public services marketing with 
alternative assumptions; but also, included an attempt to understand how premises 
held by the originators of public services marketing affected their final conclusions, 
and why some concepts (negative cases) were neglected or significantly reworked. 
The reason behind choosing theoretical triangulation was an attempt to find out if 
alternative concepts (negative cases) had potential and usefulness for the 
conceptualization of public service marketing.  
 
3. Results 
3.1. Results of the investigative research 
The results of the investigative research reported here suggested that the 
emergence of public services marketing was influenced by the introduction of the 
nonprofit marketing concept to the marketing and public administration literatures. 
In its turn, the assumptions underlying nonprofit marketing were influenced by 
such logically and conceptually coherent concepts as: broadening the scope of 
marketing and of consumer behavior (Kotler & Levy, 1969a; Zaltman & Sternthal, 
1975); generic and social concepts of marketing (Kotler, 1972); and the marketing-
as-exchange paradigm (Bagozzi, 1975). These non-empirical and mostly 
propositional works, often were justified by references to social science disciplines 
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including economics, economic history, cultural anthropology, sociology, and 
organizational theory (Belshaw, 1965; Blau & Scott, 1962; Boulding, 1970; 
Homans, 1969). 
Investigative research of public sources, such as those available on the world 
wide web which include universities’ home pages that list biographies and the 
affiliations of marketing scholars who introduced the nonprofit marketing concept, 
found that the most active of them (Kotler; Bagozzi; Levy; & Zaltman) were 
affiliated with the J.L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management at Northwestern 
University. Sheth et al.’s (1988, p.28) review of twelve schools of marketing 
identified these scholars with the social exchange school of marketing which as 
they noted was: ‚destined to be labeled as the most controversial school in the 
history of marketing.‛   
Further, investigative research suggested that the philosophical and 
methodological roots of the social exchange school of marketing were derived 
from the Chicago school of thought in economics. Analysis of biographies of the 
originators of public and nonprofit sector marketing available on the Internet found 
that the most prominent of them (Kotler; Zaltman; and Levy) were trained at 
different times at the University of Chicago. For example, at the University of 
Chicago, Kotler received a master’s degree in economics, Zaltman received a 
master’s degree in business administration, and Levy received both masters and 
doctoral degrees in behavioral psychology.  
Academic traditions of the Chicago school occupy a special niche in social 
science. Chicago University is a private institution established by John D. 
Rockefeller in 1892. During its century of existence, it has become one of the most 
influential universities in America.  Dozens of its faculty have been recognized as 
Nobel laureates including 16 Nobel laureates in the field of economics. The 
Chicago school occupies a central niche in the social sciences so it has been 
influential in forming US public policies, stimulating intellectual dialogs and 
debates, and underpinning social and political philosophies. It promotes a 
utilitarian-based version of radical individualism and extreme market doctrine, 
which is widely known as the neoclassical, libertarian, or laissez-faire economic 
paradigm.   
The Chicago school is usually associated with Milton Friedman, and broadly 
refers ‚to those who would marketize most of the public sector and who see 
government as the problem, not the solution, to most economic ills" (Lindeen, 
1994, p.24).  Milton Friedman was influenced by a defender and promoter of the 
laissez-faire school of economics and classical libertarian principles, Frederick A. 
Hayek (1899-1992). Hayek (1944) in his manifesto, The Road to Serfdom, 
formulated the main principle of the laissez-faire doctrine. This principle suggests 
that any parties in a market place should be free to produce, buy and sell anything 
that can be produced or sold at any price at which they can find a partner to the 
transaction. The negative attitude toward government’s intervention stems from 
this premise. 
Another historical root of the laissez-faire doctrine is the extreme social 
philosophy of Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), who extrapolating from Charles 
Darwin, coined the term ‚survival of the fittest‛ in his book Social Statics (1851): 
It seems hard that a laborer incapacitated by sickness from competing with 
his stronger fellows, should have to bear the resulting privations. It seems 
hard that widows and orphans should be left to struggle for life or death. 
Nevertheless, when regarded not separately, but in connection with the 
interests of universal humanity, these harsh fatalities are seen to be full of the 
highest beneficence--the same beneficence which brings to early graves the 
children of deceased parents, and singles out the low-spirited, the 
intemperate, and debilitated as the victims of an epidemic. (Cited in Schrems, 
1986, p.132). 
Modern overtones of the ‚survival of the fittest‛ philosophy advocated by the 
Chicago school can be found in the work of those Chicago school graduates who 
attempted to introduce marketing in the public sector. Kumcu & Firat (1987, p.83) 
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noted the commitment of Kotler and his associates to promotion of the Chicago 
school laissez-faire paradigm and identified overtones of the Spencerian 
philosophy in their works. They noted, for example, at an international conference 
on the marketing and development of less developed countries (LDC): ‚Philip 
Kotler invited heated arguments from the floor when he suggested that LDCs ought 
to first let marketing energy come out, and later worry about the problems free 
markets create.‛  Kumcu and Firat note that such a pro-Spencerian approach to 
economic development and marketing was not readily accepted by conference 
participants and Kotler ‚… was confronted with questions regarding who reaped 
the benefits and who carried the burdens of such an approach.‛ 
The Chicago school, which is the philosophical fundament of the Social 
exchange school of marketing, broadly assumes that: (1) society and other social 
collectivities are mere aggregates of individuals and not the structures that integrate 
social, political, and cultural factors; (2) the individual is the prime decision-
making unit and not social collectives such as ethnic and racial groups, peer groups 
at work, and neighborhood groups or communities; (3) people are cost minimizers 
and benefit maximizers motivated by personal self-interest on the basis of fully 
available information; and (4) the market economy can be studied as a separate 
self-contained system relatively independent from society, polity, and culture 
(Etzioni, 1988).  
Given these assumptions, Chicago economists advocate decentralization, 
deregulation, privatization, and unlimited individual choice as policy in the search 
for social prosperity. They argue that limiting individual choice, regulation, and 
centralization of power and decision making in government hands, creates political 
and economical shortcomings. These include: lack of responsiveness toward 
consumers and political institutions, ineffectiveness, poor decisions, lack of 
coordination, delay, unfair procedures, price-fixing, subsidies and cross-subsidies 
that create inefficiencies, limiting competition, restricting choice, retarding 
technology, and acting as a drag on productivity (Smith, 1995).  
Although Chicago economists partially agree with mainstream economists that 
markets can fail because of externalities involved and a need for common public 
goods such as national defense, they still use the criterion of individual utility as a 
starting point for understanding the theory of market failure. Thus, the Chicago 
school suggests that government intervention is needed, only if the benefits of 
intervention into voluntary exchanges among individuals expressing individual 
choice exceed the disadvantages of lost freedom (Smith, 1995). As a result of this 
philosophy, the Chicago school suggests the use of cost-benefit analysis before any 
government decision to intervene. Armed with a reductionist and intellectualist 
methodology, the representatives of Chicago school seriously discuss such 
intangible and symbolic costs and benefits as ‚warm feelings inside,‛ ‚gratitude,‚ 
‚clean conscience,‛ and the like, to support arguments against government 
regulation (Bagozzi, 1975; Kotler & Levy, 1969a). 
The social exchange school of marketing, consistent with Chicago school 
traditions, advocates interjecting the Chicago school assumptions, although with 
some variations, into the public sector. Marketers are interested in ‚understanding 
what the organization exchanges with each public; i.e., what each party gives and 
gets …[and what are]… the motivations underlying their transactions and 
satisfaction received‛ (Kotler, 1975a, p.17). Therefore, the social exchange school 
of thought postulates three major assumptions underlying the concept of public 
sector marketing: (1) an open-system model of formal organizations borrowed 
from organizational theory; (2) the concept of social exchange adapted from 
sociology; and (3) self-interest motivation advocated by ‚formalist‛ economic 
anthropologists (Table 1). These assumptions and their sources are discussed in the 
following sub-sections.   
The social exchange school of marketing assumes that an organization is "a 
purposeful coalescence of people, materials, and facilities seeking to accomplish 
some purpose in the outside world" (Kotler 1975a, p.5). Primary functions of such 
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an organization are: (1) input--attraction of sufficient resources; (2) throughput--
conversion of these resources into various products; and (3) output--distribution of 
these throughputs to the public. This conceptualization of a formal organization as 
a resource conversion machine, is consistent with the precepts of an open-system 
model of organization whose primary goal is to respond to external and internal 
pressures.  
The open-system model of formal organizations views a park and recreation 
agency as being at the center of a system that responds directly and quickly to the 
needs of an array of different publics. The agency has substantial independence to 
respond quickly to changes in the environment in which it operates. 
 
Table 1. Results of investigative research 
Social Science Disciplines Concepts Borrowed to Develop Public Services Marketing 
Organizational Behavior Open-System Model of Formal Organizations 
Sociology Individualistic Social Exchange Theory 
Economic Anthropology ‚Formalist‛ History of Marketing Exchange 
 
     
The open-system model encourages decentralized decision-making, because 
success is perceived to depend on being able to respond quickly and adapt to 
dynamic external and internal pressures. This perspective is not pre-occupied with 
following pre-established goals. It puts emphasis on efforts to attract additional 
resources from the external environment beyond those regularly provided by the 
agency’s governing body, to convert these resources into park and recreation 
programs and services, and to efficiently distribute these services. The agency is 
viewed as the primary decision-maker, it does not have to constantly see authority 
from a higher authority for its actions. 
The social exchange school of marketing recognizes four types of formal 
organizations which are differentiated by the primary beneficiaries of an 
organization's activities (the cui bono criterion). Mutual-benefit associations 
benefit their members: political parties, unions, fraternal associations, clubs, 
veterans' organizations, professional associations, and religious sects. Business 
concerns benefit their owners: industrial firms, mail-order houses, wholesale and 
retail stores, banks, insurance companies, and similar private for profit 
organizations. Service organizations benefit those categories of publics who are in 
direct contact with these organizations: social work agencies, hospitals, schools, 
legal aid societies, and mental health clinics. Finally, commonweal organizations 
benefit the public at large: The State Department, Bureau of Internal Revenue, 
military services, and police and fire departments (Kotler, 1975a, p.30).  Park and 
recreation agencies would be classified either as service or commonweal 
organizations, depending on the type of services that were offered by a particular 
agency.  
However, the social exchange school of marketing assumes that in spite of 
differences among beneficiaries, the primary goal of all types of organizations is to 
survive through responding to external and internal pressures by attracting, 
converting, and distributing scare resources in a competitive environment. Since 
the goals and functions of all formal organizations are generic, then the social 
exchange school believes that management of all types of formal organizations 
should be generic (Kotler & Murray, 1975). This school assumes that management 
of organizations can be differentiated only to the extent that an organization 
effectively or non-effectively deals with external pressures, performs its basic 
‚resource machine‛ functions, and achieves the survival goal. Thus, the social 
exchange school of marketing distinguishes between effective (responsive 
organization) and non-effective (unresponsive organization) styles of management.   
The conceptualization of an ‚unresponsive organization‛ suggests an 
organization is a bureaucratic organization (in the negative sense of that word) 
which routinizes operations, replaces personal judgement with impersonal policies, 
specializes the job of employees, and follows a rigid hierarchy of command. A 
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bureaucratic organization is maladapted to the external environment and, thus, is 
relatively unresponsive to public needs. It resists change, responds poorly to 
external pressures, and is ineffective in performing resource converting functions. 
In contrast, a ‚fully responsive organization‛ implies that the organization 
effectively responds to external and internal pressures, successfully performs 
resource converting functions, and achieves the survival goal. Fully responsive 
organizations are sensitive to public needs, willing to change and adjust their 
offerings, and seek to survive through providing full satisfaction to their 
stakeholders.    
The concept of a fully responsive organization is synonymous with a ‚doctrine 
known as ‘the marketing concept’‛ (Kotler, 1975a, p.43). The marketing concept is 
positioned as an alternative to a production or sales orientation and implies "a 
consumer’s needs orientation backed by integrated marketing aimed at generating 
consumer satisfaction as the key to satisfying organizational goals" (Kotler, 1975a, 
p.46). The major thesis advocated by the social exchange school of marketing is 
that all formal organizations should be fully responsive. That is, they should 
employ, or at least strive toward adaptation of the marketing concept as the basis 
for their operations (Kotler, 1975a).   
The social exchange school of marketing contends that pursuit of personal self-
interest is the only motivation for exchange between all formal organizations and 
their publics. Although Kotler (1975a) avoided the term ‚self-interest,‛ Bagozzi 
(1975, p.34), who acknowledged receiving Kotler’s advice, openly recognized self-
interest motivation in the context of public sector marketing: 
… many individuals, groups, and firms pursue their own self-interest. This 
is what Adam Smith meant by his reference to an ‚invisible hand.‛ 
Similarly, in his analysis of primitive societies and marketing systems, 
Frazer has shown that … the pursuit of self-interest can be the foundation 
for the web of kinship, economic, and social institutions. The recent 
exchange theories of Homans and Blau are also based on this individualistic 
assumption of self-interest. 
This philosophy proscribes the mechanics of quid pro quo motivation between 
individuals and groups or collectives. Adam Smith (1850, p.7) specified the quid 
pro quo principle that underlies his philosophy of the invisible hand in the 
following terms: ‚whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do 
this: give me that what I want, and you shall have this which you want.‛ 
Although Bagozzi made reference to alternative collectivistic assumptions 
underlying the exchange mechanism, he did not clearly state these assumptions. 
Shapiro (1973, p.124) similarly believed that this central role of self-interest in the 
context of nonprofit marketing was sufficiently self-evident that there was no need 
to discuss it: "I shall not bother discussing the concept of self-interest; it can be 
taken for granted." In summary, the self-interest motivation assumption adopted by 
the social exchange school of thought in the context of public sector marketing 
suggests one major conclusion: all relationships between formal organizations and 
their clienteles are based on self-interest. 
A central tenet of the social exchange school is that all formal organizations 
seek to attain their goals through the voluntary exchange mechanism. They 
perceive voluntary exchange to be the only alternative to theft, force, and beggary 
(Kotler, 1975a). Since a formal organization is defined as a resource converting 
machine which does not resort to force, theft, or selfless giving to attract resources, 
then the voluntary exchange mechanism is considered to be the most plausible 
option for formal organizations to attract, convert, and distribute resources.  
Kotler (1972) believes that the voluntary exchange of values should be 
conceptualized as a transaction that, in turn, is the central generic concept of 
marketing. Such an exchange requires existence of at least two conditions: 
availability of two parties, and each party possessing some resource that is valued 
by another party (Kotler 1975a, p.23). Voluntary exchanges of values are not 
limited to such conventional resources as ‚goods, services, and money … [and] 
include other resources such as time, energy, and feelings‛ (Kotler, 1972, p.49).  
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Kotler (1975a) contends that all formal organizations are involved in at least 
three types of exchange. First, business concerns and service organizations are 
involved in voluntary exchange of resources between three parties. Graphically this 
type of exchange can be shown as sequence A  B  C, where ‚‛ signifies 
‚gives to and receives from‛ (Bagozzi 1975, p. 32), A is an owner or donor, B is 
business concern or service organization, and C is a customer or client depending 
on business concern or whether the example relates to a service organization. 
Second, mutual benefit associations and commonweal organizations are involved 
in voluntary exchange between two parties. Graphically this type of exchange can 
be shown as sequence A  B, where A is a mutual benefit association or 
commonweal organization and B is a member or citizen depending on whether the 
example is a mutual benefit association or a commonweal organization. However, 
when he examined exchange in commonweal organizations such as a police or fire 
department in more detail, Kotler (1975a, p.25-28) recognized that: ‚there is a 
question of how voluntary this transaction is‛; exchange ‚seems more like a one-
way flow of value‛; and dyadic exchange ‚fails to depict the full sequence of 
exchange relationships.‛ 
Despite these observations, Kotler insisted that commonweal organizations 
were involved in exchange relationships. Kotler (1975a, p.25-29): ‚a social 
contract is voluntary entered into‛; exchange cannot take place ‚if one of the 
parties has nothing that is valued by the other party,‛ that is, one-way flow is not an 
exchange; and ‚there is a third party, the local government, that enters into 
exchange relations.‛ 
In summary, using these assumptions and a fire department as an example, 
Kotler offered a diagram of a third type of exchange relationships in commonweal 
organizations. Graphically this exchange is represented as a closed sequence of 
relationships A  B  C  A, where A is a fire department, B is local 
government, and C is citizens. 
Bagozzi (1975), who was doing graduate work under Kotler’s supervision, 
extended this typology of exchanges further by drawing upon anthropological and 
sociological literature. Bagozzi was more specific and identified three types of 
voluntary exchange (restricted, generalized, and complex) which exhibited three 
classes of meanings (utilitarian, symbolic, and mixed). Types of exchange refer to 
the number of parties involved in a transaction and the direction(s) of the exchange. 
Classes of meanings relate to the reasons or, more broadly, motivations for the 
occurring exchanges.  
First, Bagozzi (1975) distinguishes between utilitarian, symbolic, and mixed 
meanings of exchange. A utilitarian or purely economic exchange is "an interaction 
whereby goods are given in return for money or other goods and the motivation 
behind the action lies in the anticipated use or tangible characteristics commonly 
associated with the objects of exchange" (p.36). Symbolic exchange refers to "the 
mutual transfer of psychological, social, or other intangible entities between two or 
more parties" (p.36). Mixed exchange involves "both utilitarian and symbolic 
aspects, and it is difficult to separate the two" (p.36). 
Further, Bagozzi distinguishes three types of exchange. Similar to Kotler’s 
position, he identifies a restricted type of exchange as a voluntary exchange 
between any two parties, A and B. Parties A and B could be consumers, retailers, 
salesmen, organizations, park and recreation agencies or collectives. 
Diagrammatically this type of exchange is represented as A  B, where "" 
signifies "gives to and receives from." (Bagozzi, 1975, p.32). Often this type of 
exchange is referred to as direct, dyadic, or economic exchange. Restricted 
exchange is characterized by the notion of quid-pro-quo, free price-making 
mechanism, and self-interest motivation. Examples of this exchange included 
customer-salesman or wholesaler-retailer relationships. In the marketing literature, 
fundamental rules of this exchange were discussed by Alderson (1965). 
Generalized type of exchange involves univocal reciprocal relationships among 
at least three actors. The actors do not benefit each other directly, only indirectly. 
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Diagrammatically this type of exchange among three actors A, B, and C is 
represented as AB C A, where ‚" signifies "gives to." (Bagozzi 1975, p.3). 
This type of exchange sometimes is referred to as indirect or multiparty exchange. 
Bagozzi gives an example of a generalized exchange transaction between a local 
department store A, a public bus company B, and riders C.  A local department 
store (A) donates a number of benches to bus company (B); the bus company (B) 
places the benches at bus stops for the convenience of its riders (C); riders (C) are 
exposed to store’s (A) advertisement placed on the benches and patronize the store 
(A). 
Bagozzi also combined these two types of exchange and introduced a third type 
of marketing exchange which he titled ‚complex.‛ Complex exchange is a "system 
of mutual relationships between at least three parties [where] each social actor is 
involved in at least one direct exchange, while the entire system is organized by an 
interconnecting web of relationships" (Bagozzi, 1975, p.33). Bagozzi distinguishes 
between two subtypes of complex exchange: complex chain exchange which has 
open-ended sequences of direct exchanges A  B C; and complex circular 
exchange with closed-ended sequences of direct exchanges A  B  C  A.  
Bagozzi provided examples of complex exchange subtypes. Complex chain 
exchange could be a typical channel of distribution where a manufacturer (A), a 
retailer (B), and a consumer (C) depict the distribution channel A  B  C. 
Complex circular exchange can be an exchange between a person A, a television B, 
an advertising agency C, and a book publisher (D). Bagozzi (1975) saw the essence 
of public sector marketing as being in the complex type of exchange where 
government, disadvantaged citizens, public administrators, and the rest of society 
are all involved in a complex sequence of restricted and generalized exchanges 
with mixed symbolic and economic resources.  
 
3.2. Results of negative case analysis 
Negative case analysis found that alternative assumptions (negative cases) were 
available to those who introduced the public services marketing concept. A search 
for negative cases and rival hypothesis revealed that those available were: (1) open-
system and closed-system perspectives on formal organizations that could be 
operationalized using microeconomic or political system paradigms; (2) 
individualistic and collectivistic versions of social exchange theory; and (3) 
"formalist" and ‚substantivist‛ perspectives in economic anthropology with distinct 
views on the history of marketing exchange and types of economic analysis. 
Concepts that have been adopted by the social exchange school and concepts that 
have been overlooked or ignored are summarized in Table 2.  
A search for rival hypotheses in the organizational theory literature suggests 
that formal organizations can be conceptualized not only from an open-system 
model perspective but also from a closed-system model perspective. Hall (1972, 
p.49) summarized major differences between these two approaches: 
The closed-system model views organizations as instruments designed for the 
pursuit of clearly specified goals, and thus directing organizational 
arrangements and decisions toward goal achievement and toward making the 
organization more and more rational in the pursuit of its goal. The open-
system model views organizations as not only concerned with goals, but also 
responding to external and internal pressures. In some cases, the open 
perspective virtually ignores the issue of goals.  
 
Table 2. Results of negative case analysis 
Social Science Discipline Concepts Borrowed to Develop Public Sector 
Marketing 
Ignored Concepts 
Organizational Behavior Open-System Model of Formal Organizations Closed-System Model of Formal 
Organizations 
Sociology Individualistic Social Exchange Theory Collectivistic Social Exchange 
Theory 
Economic Anthropology ‚Formalist‛ History of Marketing Exchange ‚Substantivist‛ History of 
Marketing Exchange 
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The closed-system conceptualization of organizations is an older perspective 
which stems from Weber’s classical analysis of bureaucracy. Weber (1946, p.151) 
defined an organization as "a system of continuous purposive activity of a specified 
kind." This perspective suggests that an organization has a clear and explicit goal 
which determines its internal structure and the tasks undertaken to achieve this goal 
(Figure 4). Tasks are divided among members of the organization so that each 
member has responsibility for an area of activity that matches his/her competence. 
Decision-making in a closed-system organization is based on an established 
normative order and is manifested by clearly specified rules and a chain of 
command. Selection of members is based on an individual’s skills and technical 
competence. The person's membership with the organization is documented in the 
form of a written contract that delineates the individual’s duties and level of 
remuneration (Weber, 1946).  
The open-ended, or "natural-system" perspective on organizations emanates 
from a critique of the closed-ended system (Katz & Kahn, 1966, p.26) and is based 
on the conventional microeconomic paradigm. This perspective puts lesser 
emphasis on an organization's concern with goals and greater emphasis on its 
responsiveness to external pressures: 
The major misconception [of the closed-system model] is the failure to 
recognize fully that the organization is continually dependent upon inputs 
from the environment and that the inflow of materials and human energy is 
not constant. 
This perspective is based on assumption of scarce energy and resources. The 
main goal of the organization is perceived to be survival in a competitive 
surrounding environment that consists of other organizations which compete for 
the same resources. A need to survive, forces the organization to adapt to both 
controllable internal and non-controllable external forces. Therefore, it is 
conceptualized as a "natural system" which imports energy in the form of people 
and materials (input) from its external environment, alters it in some way (the 
throughput), and distributes it back to the environment (output). Survival dictates a 
"broadening of organizational goals" because the organization is dependent on 
what is imported to it, how it transforms inputs, and how the environment accepts 
the organization's output.   
Finally, there has been an attempt in the organizational literature to develop a 
balanced model of formal organizations that encompasses elements of the both the 
open-system and closed-system perspectives. The major assumption of this 
perspective is that organizations have multiple conflicting goals and thus have to 
make strategic choices in response to internal and external threats. This perspective 
tries to control three major factors: individuals within an organization; the 
environment of the organization; and form of the organization. Individuals within 
the organization are seen as the mechanism through which environmental and 
organizational characteristics are shaped. The environment is considered as being 
unstable and varying from predictable to non-predictable. By choosing the best 
strategic choice-response to a changed environment, the organization attempts to fit 
itself to the changed environment and accordingly changes its form. That is why 
contingency and choice are major elements of this perspective (Hall, 1972).  
The negative case analysis suggests that the open-system definition of an 
organization, in contrast to the closed-system definition, invites an organization-
environment approach, which implies that an organization is engaged in exchange 
relationships with the competitive environment. (Yuchtman & Seashore, 1967). In 
such an approach, differences between the goals of formal organizations become 
less apparent since all types of organizations are concerned with the issue of 
survival through efficiently attracting and distributing scarce and valued resources, 
and ensuring there is a difference between accrued revenues and expenditures. An 
open-system model interpretation of the four types of formal organizations 
classified by Blau & Scott (1962) suggests the generic nature of operational goals 
(Katz & Kahn, 1966), management functions (Kotler & Murray, 1975), and 
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marketing applications (Kotler & Levy, 1969a) for both public and private types of 
organizations.  
The alternative Weberian closed-system definition of organizations emphasizes 
the critical role of clearly specified organizational goals that will result in different, 
not generic, operational tasks; management functions; and internal and external 
arrangements of organizations. From the Weberian perspective, it is important to 
distinguish between profit organizations concerning with goal of survival and 
budget organizations concerning with bureaucratic goals. For example, a goal to 
maximize profit institutionalizes the existence of business organizations that are 
concerned with profit management. In the internal arrangements, subparts or units 
are accountable for the success or failure to attain this goal as well the whole 
organization. Therefore, management and accountability are decentralized, and 
responsibility is divided among the organization’s parts without jeopardizing the 
unity of the total operation’s achievement of the profit goal. Subordinates are 
empowered and have discretion to amend rules or regulations in order to keep their 
operations profitable (Von Mises, 1944). In the external arrangements, the profit 
goal directs decision-making relating to selection of the most profitable market 
segments for an organization.   
However, similar to the Weberian separation of profit and bureaucratic 
organizations Von Mises (1944. p.v) notes that: ‚There are areas of man’s activities 
in which there cannot be any questions of profit management and where 
bureaucratic management must prevail.‛ Bureaucratic management is bound by 
law and budget and concerned with those areas where profit management cannot 
operate. Bureaucratic management means management in strict accordance with 
the law and budget, so bureaucratic organizations do what the law and the budget 
order them to do. Accordingly, as Von Mises notes (1944, p.45): ‚bureaucratic 
management is bound to comply with detailed rules and regulations fixed by the 
authority of a superior body. The task of a bureaucrat is to perform what these rules 
and regulations order him to do. His discretion to act according to his own best 
conviction is seriously restricted by them.‛ Bureaucratic management requires very 
rigid internal and external arrangements. Internally, it implies detailed discretion 
based on bureaucratic procedures and codes of ethics such as, for example, the 
American Society for Public Administration (ASPA) Code of Ethics (Van Wart, 
1996). Externally, the law and budget requires bureaucratic managers to serve 
members of the community equally, and without showing preference to one client 
over another.  
The open-system model assumption about formal organizations fits well with 
the activities of business agencies and profit management. Business concerns are 
encouraged to compete for scarce financial resources with other business concerns 
in a competitive environment that is boosted by this economic development. 
However, the social exchange school by ignoring the closed-system model of 
formal organizations, fails to acknowledge the difference between profit oriented 
and bureaucratic oriented management. Profit and bureaucratic organizations are 
situated in different economic and political environments. Public agencies often 
enjoy the status of monopolists with no need to compete and with relatively stable 
funding in the form of tax-support from the public-at-large who own these 
organizations. Von Mises (1944, p.47) noted: ‚In public administration there is no 
connection between revenue and expenditure. The public services are spending 
money only; the insignificant income derived from special sources is more or less 
accidental.‛ The main general goal common to most public agencies is effective 
implementation of the tasks established by the public at large, on the basis of rigid 
compliance with detailed rules and regulations established by the authority or 
superior body that politically represents the public at large. However, the open-
system interpretation of public agencies distorts the pursuit of such a goal and 
inevitably arouses conflict between the requirement to comply with detailed 
regulations and the need to generate revenue.  
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Negative case analysis suggests that the term ‚bureaucracy‛ does not 
necessarily have negative connotations, and the term ‚overbureaucratized‛ when 
used to characterize an organization does not necessarily imply an unresponsive 
organization as was suggested by the social exchange school (Kotler, 1975a). Blau 
& Scott (1962, p.45) in an introduction to their classification of formal 
organizations cautioned about this fallacy: 
Note also that the criticism that an organization is ‚overbureaucratized‛ 
means quite different things in the four types of organizations. In the case of 
mutual-benefit associations, such as unions, overbureaucratization implies 
centralization of power in the hands of officials. Here it does not refer to 
inefficiency; indeed, bureaucratized unions are often ruthlessly efficient. But 
in the case of business concerns overbureaucratizion implies an elaboration 
of rules and procedures that impairs operation efficiency, and here the term is 
not used in reference to the power of management officials to decide on 
policies, since such managerial direction is expected and legitimate. 
In other words, if business concerns are bureaucratized it means that they are 
unresponsive and there is an authentic need to move towards a de-bureaucratization 
process and higher responsiveness through application of the marketing concept, as 
the social exchange school suggests. However, if commonweal organizations are 
bureaucratized it does not necessarily mean that they are unresponsive and that 
there is an urgent need to implement the marketing concept. On the contrary, Blau 
& Scott (1962, p.55) argue that ‚the maintenance of efficient bureaucratic 
mechanisms that effectively implement the objectives of the community‛ is the 
major task of commonweal organizations. According to Blau & Scott (1962) the 
de-bureaucratization of commonweal organizations (or Kotler’s suggestion to 
apply the marketing concept to make them more responsive) may lead to 
commonweal organizations jeopardizing their ability to effectively implement 
community objectives.  
Negative case analysis revealed the existence of alternative conceptualizations 
of motivation. The limitation of self-interest motivation in the context of 
commonly held resources (commons) was formulated by Hardin (1968) in his 
essay ‚The Tragedy of Commons.‛ Hardin (1968) illustrated the tragedy of the 
commons by using the example with of a pasture fixed in size, that is accessible to 
all the residents of a village. Motivated by self-interest all the villagers sought to 
maximize their own use of the pasture by grazing as many cattle as possible and 
expanding the size of their own herds. Since each villager followed the same logic 
the tragedy occurs. Receiving personal benefits, villagers fail to recognize that the 
costs of the increased grazing will be shared by all villagers. In other words, they 
fail to recognize that in the long run the cumulative effect of their short run 
independent pursuit of self-interest will harm their collective interest. Without 
adequate and timely collective measures the pasture will be destroyed.  
The example demonstrated that increasing demand on limited resources and a 
philosophy of unlimited access to commonly held resources eventually may lead to 
mutual destruction and harm. Hardin (1968) argued that education efforts to 
prevent the tragedy of commons are not enough since there can be free riders who 
will take advantage of others’ voluntary self-restrained actions. The solution 
suggested by Hardin to this type of problem is ‚mutually agreed upon coercion,‛ a 
coercion agreed upon by a majority of the people affected through democratic 
voting procedures. Mutually agreed upon coercion may takes the form of a law, 
rule, regulation, fine, or a graduated tax. Such an approach, however, requires 
people and agencies that will be responsible for enforcement of these procedures: 
that is, bureaus and bureaucrats.  
The limits of self-interest motivation in different non-economic contexts have 
been articulated conceptually and supported empirically in the social science 
literature. For example, the sociological literature introduced game The Prisoners 
Dilemma when two captured suspects are confronted with several alternatives for 
confession/non-confession and different types of punishments. A usual result of 
this game suggests that both suspects could receive minimum punishment if they 
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co-operate with each other. However, each of them by following personal self-
interest to minimize personal punishment inevitably harms each other’s’ personal 
self-interest. 
Nevertheless, Hardin’s position was debated by libertarians who associate the 
word ‚coercion‛ with the word ‚anathema‛ and by representatives of the public 
choice solution in the public administration literature. Representatives of this 
school questioned if ‚the mutually agreed upon coercion‛ is really democratic and 
voluntarily agreed upon by a majority of citizens. Representatives of the public 
choice solution coined the term ‚free rider,‛ arguing that there would be members 
of a community who would prefer to use common resources while others were 
paying for them. Public choice school advocates of the ‚user pays system‛ and 
‚vouchers‛ seek to increase the discretion of individuals by compelling them to 
‚vote with their feet‛ for levels of taxation and a need for certain government 
services. 
The social science literature seems to give a balanced consideration of the self-
interest and the coercion perspectives. The self-interest motivation was recognized 
in sociology, anthropology, and social psychology (Belshaw, 1965; Frazer, 1919; 
Homans, 1969; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). The ‚coercion mutually agreed upon‛ 
perspective was also recognized by many as a legitimate principle for doing things 
appropriate for a democratic country. Writers, whose studies were cited by the 
social exchange school, characterized it either as a ‚visible hand,‛ ‚quid pro 
without quo,‛ ‚pure gift,‛ ‚one-way transfer,‛ ‚grant economy,‛ ‚bureaucratic 
management‛ or simply ‚government‛ and ‚public administration.‛ For example, 
the philosopher Berdyaev (1948, p.185) distinguished two motivational principles 
in regard to economic life: ‚One of them says: In economic life follow up your 
own personal interest and this will promote the economic development of the 
whole, it will be good for the community, for the nation, for the state… The other 
principle says: In economic life serve others, serve the whole community and then 
you will receive everything which you need for your life.‛ Similarly, the economist 
Von Mises (1944) referred to the same distinction as ‚two contrary methods of 
doing things‛ in a democratic society: ‚the private citizens’ way and the way in 
which the offices of the government and the municipalities are operated.‛ Von 
Mises termed them, ‚profit management‛ and ‚bureaucratic management.‛ 
Another economist Boulding (1970), adapting from the philosopher Sorokin (1964) 
the distinction between compulsory and familistic types of social relationships, 
discussed the malevolence and benevolence types of motivation that underlie the 
threat and love integrative forces. The anthropologist Sahlins (1965) distinguished 
between altruistically motivated transaction and subordination to central authority, 
as did Polanyi (1944) and Dalton (1971) who differentiated between politically or 
socially defined obligations and self-interest motivation. Finally, one of the 
definitions of government articulated by Abraham Lincoln recognized the limits of 
invisible hand and a need for bureaucratic management: ‚a legitimate object of 
government, … to do for a community of people, whatever they need to have done, 
but cannot do, at all, or cannot, so well do, for themselves—in their separate, and 
individual capacities‛ (cited in Shafritz & Russell, 1997). 
Negative case analysis suggests that self-interest motivation fits well with the 
activities of business organizations or profit management. However, negative case 
analysis also suggests that there is a contradiction in the social exchange school’s 
conceptualization of public sector marketing between self-interest motivation and 
the code of ethic practiced by public administrators. Contrary to the social 
exchange school interpretations, Blau & Scott (1962) argued that self-interest plays 
a limited role in the governance of nonbusiness formal organizations such as 
mutual-benefit associations, service organizations, and commonweal organizations. 
They contended that in the case, for example, of a mutual benefit association such 
as a labor union, self-interest condemns the organization: ‚If union leaders usurp 
the role of prime beneficiary and run the union as if they owned it for their personal 
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benefit, the organization is condemned for no longer serving the proper functions 
of a labor union.‛ (p.44). 
Service organizations are in a similar case. In service organizations, such as 
social work agencies, hospitals, some park and recreation agencies, schools and 
universities, the welfare of clients, participants, patients, and students is presumed 
to be the chief concern. This concern usually is cemented in codes of ethics 
adopted by professions as, for example, oaths, rules, or codes of ethic in the 
medical, military, law enforcement, and jurisprudence professions. These 
regulations are based on an assumption that while customers are able to look after 
their own self-interest in a store, the same customers often do not know what will 
best serve their own interest in relationships with professional service 
organizations. For example, patients in a hospital may or may not want surgery 
intervention in their bodies. However, it is a doctor or medical professional who 
determines and decides for patients what is in their best interest and what is the 
best treatment for a particular health problem on the basis of professional and 
ethical considerations. Similarly, clients who pay lawyers for legal advice may 
guess what is good in their case, but it is the lawyers who decide what is in the 
client’s best legal interest on the basis of professional and ethical standards, and not 
considerations of personal gain at the expense of the client. Lawyers who 
personally gain at the expense of client interests are usually condemned by the bar 
association and deprived of their practice. Finally, in the example of a university 
used by Kotler (1975a), Blau & Scott (1962, pp.52-53) argue that ‚students are best 
served when professional educators determine what and how they are to be taught‛ 
and not when students themselves decide what and how they need to study. Blau & 
Scott (1962, p.51) identified clear differences between the motivations of business 
and public decision-makers: 
… while the businessman’s decisions are expected to be governed by his self-
interest--as epitomized in the phrase ‚caveat emptor‛ – the professional’s 
decisions are expected to be governed not by his own self-interest but by his 
judgement of what will serve the client’s interest best. The professions are 
institutionalized to assure, in the ideal case, that the practitioner’s self-interest 
suffers if he seeks to promote it at the expense of optimum service to clients. 
 In the Code of Ethics developed by the American Society for Public 
Administration (ASPA) (Van Wart, 1996) employees of public sector organizations 
are seen to ‚serve the public interest beyond serving oneself.‛ The ASPA’s 
guidelines are consistent with Blau’s (1964) contention that public servants must 
‚abstain from exchange relationships‛ with clients and serve the public interest in 
‚detached manner‛ with personal ‚disinterest.‛  
The presence of self-interest in the relation of clients with commonweal 
organizations inevitably leads to ethical and even legal conflicts. For example, 
Locke & Woicenshyn (1995) argue that the cynical egoism code that is commonly 
taught in business schools as the subjective expected utility (SEU) model is 
inappropriate for the character of social service because it advocates dishonesty "... 
if one feels like it, if it helps gratify one's immediate desires, and if the cost 
(likelihood of getting caught) is low" (p.406). In the like vein, Blau & Scott (1962, 
p.44-45) note: 
Commonweal organizations, in sharp contrast, are not expected to be oriented 
to the interests of their ‚clients,‛ that is, those persons with whom they are in 
direct contact. A police department, for example, that enters into collusion 
with racketeers fails to discharge its responsibility to the public-at-large and 
is no longer the protective organization it is assumed to be. Likewise, if 
policemen solicit bribes instead of enforcing the law, or the police 
commissioner runs the department to further his political ambitions, the 
public’s position as prime beneficiary of the organization suffers.  
Thus, application of self-interest motivation in the context of public 
organizations, as was suggested by the social exchange school of marketing is 
contradictory. Negative case analysis suggests that arrangement of formal 
organizations with environments can be explained not only from an exchange 
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perspective, as suggested by the social exchange school, but also from the 
redistributionand/or reciprocity perspectives. The concept of redistribution, as well 
as the concept of reciprocity, was developed by those adapting a substantivist 
perspective in economic anthropology and collectivistic sociology (Dalton, 1971; 
Ekeh, 1974; Levi-Strauss, 1969; Polanyi, et al., 1957; Polanyi, 1944; Sahlins, 
1965). This perspective attempts to analyze economic life in primitive and modern 
societies from three different approaches: reciprocal arrangements based on the 
symmetry principle; redistributive arrangements based on the centricity principle; 
and marketing exchange arrangements based on price-making markets.  
Reciprocity implies a symmetrical sequence (AB/ BA) among just two partners 
or (AB/BC/CA/AC) among more than two fixed partners. Redistribution is 
centripetal movement of resources among many actors within a group upon one 
central figure followed by the action of that central figure upon the actors within 
the group in unison and repartition (BA/CA/DA/ and then A/BCD). Finally, 
marketing exchange is chaotic movements (A/BCD, B/ACD, and C/ABD) 
(Polanyi, et al., 1957, pp. vii-viii). This ‚sunbstantivist‛ perspective is different 
from the ‚formalist‛ perspective which recognizes only marketing exchange 
arrangements (Belshaw, 1965).  
Substantivists theorize that redistribution is payment to, and disbursement by, a 
central political authority. It implies a hierarchically structured group and that there 
is a center of the group. The primary mechanism of redistribution is sharing. 
Members of a group pool their resources at a center, and this pooled or common 
resource is then shared among the group members according to commonly 
accepted distributive rule. The tax systems of industrial countries or payments to 
the chief in primitive societies are typical examples of redistributive arrangements. 
Sahlins (1965, p.141) referred to redistribution as ‚pooling.‛ Pooling is 
‚centralized movements: collection from members of a group, often under one 
hand, and redivision within this group… This is ‚pooling‛ or ‚redistribution‛ 
…pooling is socially a within relation, the collective action of a group.‛ The most 
important principles that characterize redistribution arrangements are centricity and 
the group membership rules. Sahlins (1965, 1972) contrasted redistribution as a 
‚within relation‛ with reciprocity as a ‚between relation‛.  Reciprocity is 
obligatory gift-giving among kin and friends. Sahlins (1965) maintained that on a 
very general view ‚pooling‛ and ‚reciprocity‛ can merge. However, he believed 
that the course of analytic wisdom is to separate the array of economic transactions 
in the ethnographic record into two types because their social organization is very 
different. Sahlins (1965) noted that there is a popular tendency to consider between 
relations (reciprocity) as a balanced unconditional one-for-one exchange. However, 
referring to abundant ethnographic records, he recognized that reciprocity is rather 
a ‚a whole class of exchanges, a continuum of forms.‛ This continuum ranges from 
‚the assistance freely given‛ or ‚pure gift‛ at one end of the spectrum and ‚self-
interested seizure‛ or ‚appropriation by chicanery or force‛ at the other pole.  
Accordingly, Sahlins classified diverse forms of reciprocities as ranging from 
the ‚generalized reciprocity, the solidarity extreme,‛ through the ‚balanced 
reciprocity, the midpoint;‛ to the ‚negative reciprocity, the unsociable extreme.‛ 
By generalized reciprocity, Sahlins understood ‚transactions that are putatively 
altruistic, transactions on the line of assistance given and, if possible and necessary, 
assistance returned.‛ Ethnographic examples of such relationships include 
‚sharing,‛ ‚help,‛ ‚free gift,‛ and ‚generosity.‛ By balanced reciprocity he 
understood ‚the simultaneous exchange of the same types of goods to the same 
amount.‛ Balanced reciprocity is more economic and less personal and 
ethnographic examples include ‚trade‛ and ‚buying-selling‛ that involve 
‚primitive money.‛ Finally, negative reciprocity is ‚the attempt to get something 
for nothing with impunity, the several forms of appropriation, transactions opened 
and conducted toward net utilitarian advantage.‛ Ethnographic examples include 
such relationships as ‚haggling,‛ ‚barter,‛ ‚gambling,‛ ‚chicanery,‛ and ‚theft.‛ 
Sahlins (1965) suggested that in most societies ‚generalized reciprocity‛ is the 
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norm within family relationships and ‚negative reciprocity‛ predominates in 
economic relationships outside the family in modern industrial societies. To 
explain other economic activities in society, such as payment of taxes and public 
services, Sahlins argued that a different analytical category and analysis was 
needed. While Sahlins (1965) believed that it was wise to separate the array of 
economic transactions in the ethnographic record into two types (reciprocity and 
redistribution) because their social organizations are very different, Ekeh (1974), 
whose study was adopted by the social exchange school, used a different approach. 
Referring to Levi-Strauss’s (1969) studies of kinship, Ekeh (1974) distinguished 
between direct reciprocity and generalized reciprocity.  
Direct reciprocity characterizes relationships where actor A expects to be 
benefited directly by actor B, whenever A benefits B. Ekeh refers to this type of 
reciprocity as restricted exchange and notes that restricted exchange can take two 
major forms. Given only two parties, A and B, restricted exchange has the form A 
 B, and this is referred to as exclusive restricted exchange. Given several parties, 
for example, three individuals A, B, and C, restricted exchange has the form A  
B  C and this is referred to as inclusive restricted exchange. Both types of 
restricted exchange based on direct reciprocity are characterized by the notion of 
quid-pro-quo, emotional load, attempts to maintain equality, tensions, distrust, 
frequent conflicts over fairness, instability, mechanical solidarity, and brittle 
relationships (Ekeh, 1974; Gillmore, 1987; Uehara, 1990; Yamagishi & Cook, 
1993). Restricted or dyadic exchange is traditional economical exchange motivated 
by self-interest motivation and profit considerations. This exchange is 
characterized by Adam Smith’s quid-pro-quo notion: "whoever offers to another a 
bargain of any kind, proposes to do this: give me that what I want, and you shall 
have this which you want" (Smith, 1850, p. 7). 
Univocal reciprocity characterizes relationships that involve at least three actors 
and where actors do not benefit each other directly, but only indirectly. Ekeh refers 
to this type of relationship as generalized exchange that also has two forms. Chain 
generalized exchange has the form A  B  C A, where, "" signifies "gives 
to." It is operated by chain univocal reciprocity when actors in the system are so 
positioned that they operate a chain of univocal reciprocations to each other as 
individual units. Net generalized exchange operated by net univocal reciprocity. 
Net univocal reciprocity denotes empirically observed situations where 
relationships can be individual-focused or group-focused. In individual-focused 
exchange relationships, the group as a whole benefits each member consecutively 
until all members have each received the same amount of benefits and attention 
(ABC D; ABD  C; ACD B; BDC A). In a group-focused exchanges, 
individuals give to the group as a unit and then gain back as part of the group from 
each of the unit members (A BCD; B ACD; C ABD; D ABC). 
Generalized exchange produces a high degree of social solidarity among parties, 
and establishes trust and commitment. Ekeh (1974) believed that generalized 
exchange and univocal reciprocity generate collective rights and lead to concepts 
such as ‚payment of taxes‛ and "citizenship".  
Although Ekeh clearly formulated different assumptions underlying each type 
of reciprocity, serious limitations of his study were the focus on kinship 
relationships, and the failure to distinguish between ‚pooling‛ and ‚reciprocity.‛ 
Discussing individual and group-focused net-univocal reciprocities, Ekeh (1974) 
recognized:  
Sahlins… makes a distinction between ‘pooling’ and ‘reciprocity’. What he 
refers to as pooling seems to be a combination of the two types of net 
reciprocity that I identify here… Although Sahlins’ conception of pooling 
appears insightful, it is doubtful that it is separate from reciprocity as 
conceived in net generalized exchange.  
Recent studies, however, emphasize crucial differences between reciprocity and 
redistribution in the context of social policy (e.g. Brody, 1985). Thus, in the 
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context of public policy and the public sector it is important to follow Sahlins’ type 
of analysis and to distinguish between reciprocity and redistribution.  
This negative case analysis suggests that interpreting of a formal organization’s 
interaction with its environment as a voluntary exchange of values, fits well with 
business organizations and the profit management philosophy. This law of 
exchange has been commonly accepted by business and marketing scholars. 
However, negative case analysis and a review of original sources (Blau, 1964; Blau 
& Scott, 1962) used by the social exchange school (Kotler, 1975a; Kotler & 
Murray, 1975) suggests some contradictions in the interpreting public agencies’ 
interaction with their environment in terms of voluntary exchange. For example, 
contrary to the assertions of the social exchange school which adopted the Blau & 
Scott (1962) taxonomy of organizations, Blau (1964) denied that voluntary 
exchange was applicable to public organizations. The reason for his denial was the 
inherent conflict between bureaucratic rules of conduct and exchange relationships 
in these types of organizations. For example, when discussing service 
organizations, Blau (1964, p.261) noted: 
Professionals are expected to be governed in their work exclusively by 
professional standards of performance and conduct and not by considerations 
of exchange with clients. Although free professionals depend on fees from 
clients for their livelihood, the professional code of ethics demands that they 
do not let this fact influence their decisions and that these economic 
transactions do not affect the social interaction in which professional services 
are rendered to clients. The professional must refrain from engaging in 
reciprocal social exchange with clients lest his decisions be influenced by the 
exchange instead of being based only on his best judgement in terms of 
professional standards. 
Discussing commonweal organizations, Blau (1964, p.263) noted the existence 
of the same conflict between bureaucratic rules and exchange transactions citing 
the empirical studies that he and Scott used in their work on classification of formal 
organizations in 1962: 
The situation of bureaucratic officials who provide services to clients is 
similar to that of professionals. Officials in a bureaucracy are expected to 
treat clients in a detached manner in accordance with official rules, and this 
requires that officials abstain from exchange relationships with clients, 
because exchange transactions would make them obligated to and dependent 
for rewards on clients. Even if it is only the gratitude and approval of clients 
an official wants to earn, his concern with doing so can hardly fail to 
influence his decisions and lead him to depart from official procedures. If 
officials become dependent on clients either for rewards they personally seek 
or for services of clients the organization needs, they must enter into 
exchange transactions with clients, which means that they cannot strictly 
follow bureaucratic procedures in their relations with client.  
The absence of direct exchange relationships between nonbusiness 
organizations and their clients based on the quid pro quo notion was a principal 
argument used by Luck (1969; 1974) against acceptance of the broadened 
marketing proposition and the social marketing concept. Luck (1969, p.54) noted 
the existence of exchange relations of public organizations with their clients as a 
process of "corruptly committing illegal acts," which is consistent with Blau’s 
(1964) position of a ‚departure from official procedures.‛  
In response to its critics, the social exchange school attempted to use the notion 
of an indirect quid pro quo and to introduce concepts of indirect, restricted, 
generalized, and complex exchanges (Kotler & Levy, 1969b; Bagozzi, 1975). 
However, a closer analysis of these concepts revealed that this school still relies 
heavily on an exchange paradigm which ignores the ‚absence of exchange relations 
with clients‛ requirement as a fundamental condition in the functioning of public 
agencies. The results of negative case analysis suggest that consciously or 
unconsciously the social exchange school of marketing overlooked the main 
condition for governing the functioning of public organizations suggested by Blau 
(1964, p.263):    
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An essential element of professional and bureaucratic detachment is the 
absence of exchange relations with clients. Exchange transactions create 
obligations that make it impossible to conform undeviatingly to professional 
or bureaucratic standards. 
Thus, the complex exchange concept has limited adequacy for 
conceptualization and explanation of public agencies’ interaction with their 
environment. It appears, that the concepts of redistribution or reciprocity might be 
superior conceptual constructs for operationalizing and accounting for such 
interactions, because they recognize the ‚absence of exchange relations with 
clients‛ requirement to be crucial for bureaucratic management.  
 
3.3. The results of theoretical triangulation 
The existence of alternative assumptions and the contradictions found in the 
social exchange school’s interpretation of public sector marketing during the 
negative case analysis permits theoretical triangulation. The results of the 
theoretical triangulation are summarized in Figure 1.  
The figure derived by cross-tabulating marketing categories (column) with 
types of organizations (rows) and graphical examples. It includes the social 
exchange school’s assumptions about organization, motivation, and arrangements, 
and the alternative assumptions about the same categories that were revealed in the 
negative case analysis. The types of organizations are categorized under the 
headings of profit, bureaucratic, and non-profit organizations. This recognizes Von 
Misses’ distinction between profit management and bureaucratic management, or 
more simply between profit and government organizations. This distinction has 
been recognized in the public administration literature (Allison, 1992; Rainey, et 
al., 1976). Non-profit management and nonprofit organizations are added to this 
dichotomy, as occupying the middle ground between government and private profit 
organizations. Non-profit organizations are those organizations that according to 
law are excluded from an obligation to pay taxes on profits provided that the profit 
is reinvested in their operations (Rados, 1981).  
Three categories of marketing are recognized in the figure: organization, 
motivation, and arrangement modes. There is agreement that these major categories 
constitute minimum areas of interests for the marketing discipline (Kotler, 1975a). 
Finally, the bottom horizontal row graphically illustrates the alternative 
assumptions. The triangulation of organization types with marketing categories 
suggests three possible conceptualizations of public park and recreation marketing: 
the exchange perspective; the redistribution perspective; and the reciprocity 
perspective. 
 
 
Figure 1. The Results of Theoretical Triangulation 
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4. Discussion 
The first column in Figure 1 represents the social exchange school’s 
controversial conceptualization of generic marketing based on the major 
assumptions about organization, motivation, and arrangement that were discussed 
earlier in the chapter. It is based on an interpretation of formal organizations as 
open-systems; motivated by pursuit of self-interest; and using voluntary exchange 
to interact with the environment.  
This perspective attempts to view a public agency as being a profit management 
organization which is the center of a system that responds directly and quickly to 
an array of different interest groups. It reflects a department that has been delegated 
wide discretion to interact with, and which responds directly to the needs of, its 
various external interest groups including central government in its jurisdiction. 
The agency is given broad sideboards, defined by financial boundaries and general 
goals, but within those sideboards it has substantial independence to respond 
quickly to changes in the environment in which it operates. 
This perspective encourages decentralized decision-making, because success is 
perceived to depend on being able to respond quickly and adapt to dynamic 
external and internal pressures. According to this perspective the organization is 
not pre-occupied with following pre-established goals. It puts emphasis on efforts 
to attract additional resources from its external environment beyond those regularly 
provided by the agency’s governing body, to convert these resources into public 
services, and to efficiently distribute these services. The organization is viewed as 
the primary decision-maker.  
This perspective emphasizes voluntary exchange rather than coercion or selfless 
giving to attract, convert, and distribute resources. Voluntary exchange requires 
two conditions: (1) there are at least two parties who are free to enter into an 
exchange; and (2) each party has something that might be valued by the other 
party. This perspective is based on the assumption that the collective need for 
public service is served best when the managers of an agency, its employees, and 
its users pursue their own self-interests. From this perspective, an agency’s 
interaction with its interest groups diagrammatically can be represented asA  B 
 C  A, where ‚‛ signifies ‚gives to and receives from,‛ and where ‚A‛ is a 
city council or the city manager’s office, ‚B‛ is a public agency, and ‚C‛ is a group 
of citizens.   
The middle column in Figure 1represents a conceptualization of marketing 
based on a closed-system model of formal organizations; ‚coercion mutually 
agreed upon‛ motivation; and a redistribution arrangement mode. This perspective 
attempts to view a public agency as a bureaucratic organization. The agency is 
viewed as a substantively constrained subsystem of a larger political system having 
relatively little freedom for responsive action without approval from a dominant 
political center that governs the system. A public agency is subject to tight central 
control enforced by the city manager’s office and /or by a city council. Almost all 
decisions have to ‚go through channels‛ and be authorized by the central 
authorities before actions can be taken. This perspective stresses pursuit of clearly 
specified goals and procedures, and a pyramidal hierarchy of positions and 
regulations. They are designed in accordance with the philosophy that says, ‚If this 
is the goal, then these are the most rational procedures for achieving it.‛ The tasks, 
sphere of activities, and authority to make decisions are clearly delineated, tightly 
defined and proscribed. They are assigned to members of the agency based on their 
position in the hierarchical pyramid. All decisions are centralized and employees in 
the middle and lower echelons of the pyramid have very limited discrete decision-
making authority. 
This perspective implies that a public agency achieves its goals through the 
notion of redistribution. Redistribution entails obligatory payments of money 
objects (taxes) by community members to a democratically elected government. 
The government uses the receipts for its own maintenance, as emergency stock in 
case of individual or community disaster, and for the provision of needed different 
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community services. Redistribution payments (taxes) to a government (socially 
recognized center) are an expression of politically and democratically defined 
obligations, and redistribution disbursements (public services) by government are 
determined democratically by political and legislative decisions and voting 
procedures. This perspective postulates that the collective need for public services 
in the community is best met when the managers and it employees of a public 
agency serve the public interest rather than their own self-interest. From this 
perspective, a public agency’s interaction with its interest groups diagrammatically 
can be represented as: CB  A  CB  A, where: ‚‛ signifies ‚redistributive 
payments‛; ‚‛ signifies ‚redistribution disbursements;‛ ‚‛ signifies ‚a period 
of time‛; and ‚A‛ is a city council or the city manager’s office with a subservient 
public agency, and ‚B‛ and ‚C‛ are groups of citizens.   
The third column in Figure 1is an attempt to view a public agency as a non-
profit management organization. It is based on the contingency-choice model of 
formal organization characterized by altruistic motivation and a reciprocal 
arrangement mode. This type of organization has a flat hierarchy, decentralized 
decision-making, and makes efforts to attract additional resources from external 
sources and to quickly respond to interest groups. However, it has clearly specified 
goals and mission that is tightly defined by law and which cannot be changed. The 
organization tries to balance two conflicting goals: not to change its clearly 
specified mission, and to attract additional resources by responding quickly to 
interest groups. 
The reciprocity perspective believes that the collective need for public service 
in a community is served best when the managers and employees and interest 
groups rely on altruism and benevolence attitudes. According to this philosophy, 
managers and employees, and community members, sacrifice their own self-
interests for the collective interests and also offer for generous help and assistance 
to preserve public wealth.  
Interaction of this type of organization with its environment is based on 
generalized reciprocity which is characterized by there being at least three parties 
involved which do not benefit each other directly, only indirectly. From this 
perspective, a public agency’s interaction with its interest groups diagrammatically 
can be represented as A  B  C  A, where ‚‛ signifies ‚gives to‛ and where 
‚A‛ is a city council or city manager’s office, ‚B‛ is a public agency, and ‚C‛ is a 
group of citizens.   
 
5. Conclusion 
The results of this study contribute to existent critical studies in several 
important ways. First, they link assumptions underlying the social exchange school 
of marketing with the assumptions of the Chicago school. Few attempts have been 
done in previous studies to trace the intellectual roots of the school and to identify 
this connection.  
Second, the non-empirical results of this study show that the social exchange 
school of marketing is loyal to the methodological and epistemological traditions 
of the Chicago school. The social exchange school employed a reductionist 
methodology with minimal reliance on empirical testing. As a result of such a 
methodological approach, the diversity of social concepts that can be found in the 
social science literature was reduced to fit the assumptions of the Chicago school.  
Third, the results of qualitative research demonstrated that the concepts adopted 
from social science were misinterpreted and biased, and were significantly adapted 
to fit the assumptions of the Chicago school. Analysis showed that most of these 
adaptations conflict with, and conceptually contradict, mainstream 
conceptualizations of public agencies in the organizational behavior and general 
public administration literatures.  
Fourth, the results documented the consistent efforts of the social exchange 
school to spread their confusing conceptualization of public sector marketing into 
different disciplines and academic publications where they found some support.  
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Finally, the results introduce alternative concepts from the social science 
literature that have significant potential for explaining the organization, motivation, 
and internal and external arrangements of public agencies with employees and 
communities. 
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